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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHARLES L. BENNETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7287 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the Dis-
trict Court of the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake 
County, in favor of the plaintiff below. The total verdict 
was in the sum of $70,000, but the jury deducted therefrom 
the sum of $20,000 by reason of the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff, thereby returning a net verdict for $50,000 
(R. 72). The accident and injury complained of by the 
plaintiff, Charles L. Bennett, age 26 years, occurred about 
8:3,5 p. m. on January 7, 1948, in the yards· of The Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, at Buena Vista, 
Colorado ( R. 2, 13) . 
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Prior to the accident, the plaintiff was working as 
head brakeman on an eastbound freight train, known as 
local No. 36 (R. 131). The freight train, consisting of about 
sixty freight cars and a four unit diesel engine, arrived in 
Buena Vista at about 7 :40 p. m. (R. 135). It was dark at 
the time ( R. 137) . Most of the cars of the train were left 
standing on the main line track, while the engine engaged 
in various switching movements in the yard. Plaintiff 
assisted ~in these movements (R. 137-144). After several 
switching operations, the engine arrived at a position facing 
south on the stock or ice house track, coupled ahead of a 
string of fourteen freight cars (R. 147). As shown by the 
map, plaintiff's Exhibit D, the stock or ice house track ex-
tends in a north and south direction, parallel with the main 
line and passing tracks located just to the east. The stock 
or ice house track commences in the vicinity of an ice house 
at the north end of the yard and runs southerly for ap-
proximately 3,000 feet. At its southerly point it joins with 
the passing track just north of where that track crosses the 
main street of Buena Vista. The passing track then con- . 
tinues southerly approximately 400 feet, crosses the main 
street, passes in front of the railroad depot, and joins the 
main line track at a point known as the main line switch. 
The plaintiff was injured as the engine and the cut of 
fourteen cars moved southerly (eastward according to rail-
road directions) on the ice house or stock track. He was 
stationed on the top of the rear or fourteenth car, in order 
to pass signals forward to the engineer and fireman in the 
cab of the locomotive (R. 144-145). The engine and cut of 
cars started from a position just south of the ice house and 
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moved forward at a slow speed, in response to a lantern 
signal given by the plaintiff (R. 148, 149). As the car on 
which the plaintiff was riding neared the derail, located on 
the stock or ice house track some 144 feet north of the main 
street crossing, plaintiff according to his testimony moved 
forward on the roof of the car he was riding, preparatory 
to climbing down the west or right side ladder located at 
the forward end of the car (R. 153). Plaintiff claimed that 
as he was in the act of crouching to descend the ladder there 
was severe slack action in the train (R. 184), which dis-
lodged him from the car and caused him to fall to the 
ground (R. 150). His right arm was run over by the car 
wheels (R. 150). Thereafter, he was rushed to the hos-
pital at Salida, Colorado, where his arm was amputated 
five inches below the shoulder (R. 229). 
At the trial, the plaintiff produced as his witness on 
the issue of damages a Mr. Ray G. Wood. Since defendant 
predicates several assignments of error on the basis of Mr. 
Wood's testimony, it is herein set forth in some detail. Mr. 
Wood was a partner in a firm of certified public account-
ants in Salt Lake City. He had majored in accounting and 
received a Bachelor of Science degree from the University 
of Utah. He had been in practice as an accountant for about 
twenty-five years (R. 235). The witness stated that he was 
not and didn't pretend to be an actuary (R. 239) . An 
actuary was a person employed by an insurance company 
to make such computations as an insurance company uses. 
An important part of the work of an actuary consists in 
computing annuities (R. 239). Mr. Wood had brought to 
court with him the written document Exhibit G (R. 2'35). 
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He was a frequent witness for Mr. Black in railroad cases 
(R. 275), and on numerous occasions in the past had pre-
pared exhibits similar to Exhibit G (R. 246). His employ-
ment in this capacity was profitable (R. 275). 
According to Mr. Wood, Exhibit G contained computa-
tions of the present value of various monthly annuities at 
stipulated rates of interest for 457 monthly periods (R. 238). 
In the preparation of Exhibit G, a portion of the informa-
tion contained ~in the American Experience Table of Mor-
tality had been used (R. 236). Reference also had been 
made to some mathematical tables and formulas contained 
in a certain book ( R. 242-243, 249) . In addition, certain 
mathematical calculations had been made because the tables 
and formulas in the book extended only to 360 periods, 
whereas Exhibit G covered 457 periods (R. 250, 257-258). 
Exhibit G consisted of computations based upon an appl,ica-
tion and combination of these three separate sources of in-
formation. 
The American Experience Table of Mortality had been 
referred to in the preparation of Exhibit G, in order to 
ascertain the life expectancy of an individual twenty-six 
years of age (R. 236-23'7). This life expectancy table was 
included in the state statutes, Volume 6. Mr. Wood had not 
personally looked up the figure or checked it, but some other 
person in his office had secured the information (R. 240). 
Over the defendant's objection, Mr. Wood then was per-
mitted to testify that the life expectancy figure indicated 
for a person twenty-six years of age was 38.12 years or 457 
months ( R. 2'37) . The American Experience Table of Mor-
tality consisted, in part, of a table which showed the mor-
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tality experience of major insurance companies in the 
United States and the future life expectancy of a person 
at a certain attained age (R. 236). It was based only upon 
people who were considered insurable risks by insurance 
companies (R. 280). 'Vith reference to any particular in-
dividual, the life expectancy table was purely a matter of 
speculation (R. 278). It did not take into consideration an 
~ individual's occupational·hazards (R. 278), or the fact that 
railroad men were "rated up" or given a much higher 
mortality rating than ordinary occupations (R. 278). 
After somebody had told Mr. Wood what the life ex-
pectancy was for a person twenty-six years of age, refer-
ence then had been made to certain mathematical tables and 
formulas contained in some book (R. 242). While on the 
stand during the morning session of the court, the witness 
stated that he had forgotten the name of the author of the 
book, but he believed it was published by an outfit in 
Boston, the Century Publishing Company (R. 243). It was 
hard to say what the mathematical tables in the book did 
reflect; they were a mass of arithmetical calculations (R. 
242). The book also contained various tables, interest rates 
and annuity computations (R. 243). The book made the 
calculations in certain formulas. The book was used because 
it was economical in time to do so (R. 249). It was a 
"standard" book used by accountants and investment houses 
in the computation of bond and interest rates and all that 
sort of thing (R. 246). The defendant moved to strike the 
latter statement as a mere conclusion and as hearsay, but 
the trial court denied the motion ( R. 246) . 
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After the noon recess, the court permitted further 
testimony from the witness Wood. At that time Mr. Wood 
had with him the book or books to which he previously had 
referred (R. 256). The book was entitled "Financial Com-
pound Interest and Annuity Tables," and was published 
by the Financial Publishing Company. Also, Mr. Wood had 
checked with the First Security Trust Company and had 
found that the book was used by that institution (R. 2·56), 
but for what purpose the witness did not state. Although 
specifically asked by plaintiff's counsel to do so, he could 
name no other trust company, bank, or any one else in Salt 
Lake City who used the book as a "standard" work (R. 
2·56) . During the noon recess Mr. Wood had spot checked 
the tables in the book against the tables in another book en-
titled "Mathematics of Finance" by McKenzie. The mathe-
matical formulas in both books were in agreement (R. 2'57). 
He also. had compared during the noon recess some of the 
tables in the book "Financial Compound Interest and An-
nuity '~a:bles" with the "Accountant's Handbook," and the 
tables in both books were the same (R. 260). The book 
"Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables" was 
published in 1942. According to the fly leaf, it was pre-
pared "under editorial supervision," but Mr. Wood didn't 
know who actually had prepared the tables (R. 259). He did 
not know whether or not the 'American Institute of Ac-
countants had approved the book (R. 260). He did not ~ow 
whether or not any actuarial societies had approved the 
book or the tables and formulas contained therein (R. 261). 
Then under leading questions put by the trial judge, the 
witness stated the conclusion that the book "Financial Com-
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pound Interest and Annuity Tables" and the book "Mathe-
matics of Finance" were "standard works" accepted by the 
people in his profession (R. 267). In the preparation of Ex-
hibit G, Mr. Wood had taken from the book "Financial Com-
::: pound Interest and Annuity Tables" certain information 
from the table on the present worth of one dollar per period. 
He had used the interest rate figures of 2%, 3, and one other 
figure (R. 262). 
In addition to the information taken from the life 
expectancy chart of the American Experience Table of 
Mortality and the information taken from the book "Finan-
cial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables," a third source 
of information was used in the preparation of Exhibit G. 
This consisted of certain calculations made in Mr. Wood's 
office and based in part upon formulas contained in the book 
"Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables." In the 
book the tables only extended to 360 periods, whereas Ex-
hibit G was based upon 457 periods. So it was necessary to 
calculate to 457 periods above the 3~60 periods in the book 
(R. 258). That was what Mr. Wood meant when he said 
that the figures used on Exhibit G did not appear in the 
book; the book didn't go high enough. In calculating to 457 
periods, however, the formulas were taken from the book 
(R. 250). The witness Wood had proved some of the figures 
in the book to his satisfaction (R. 249-250). But he had 
not checked the tables in the two books referred to, against 
the figures and computations on Exhibit G. He had taken 
other amounts that appeared in the book because the figures 
on Exhibit G were complicated (R. 257). Moreover, he had 
not made any independent calculation to verify the accuracy 
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of the figures on Exhibit G (R. 265) . He had made a calcu-
lation of figures of smaller denomination that were easier 
to figure (R. 26·5). He never had taken any of the figures 
on Exhibit G and worked them out mathematically, without 
reliance upon the formulas contained in the book (R. 266). 
The witness declined to step to the blackboard in the court 
room and independently of any tables compute the present 
value of an annuity of $1 per month at 2%L% for a life ex-
pectancy of 38.12 years; he said that he could do it, but it 
would take him a month to work it out (R. 265-266, 275). 
The contents of Exhibit G apparently were computed 
by combining and applying the information from the three 
sources above stated. The computations were made in Mr. 
Wood's office (R. 245). The.figures on Exhibit G were not 
personally checked by Mr. Wood (R. 246-247). Nor was 
there any testimony that the figures were computed or 
checked under his supervision or direction. 
In making the computations on Exhibit G, the interest 
was compounded monthly, not annually (R. 2612). When an-
nuities were calculated by an actuary, the interest was com-
pounded on an annual basis. Mr. Wood knew that the com-
pounding of interest annually was the usual basis for such 
a computation (R. 262), nevertheless he computed it on a 
monthly basis (R. 263). Furthermore, Exhibit G was com-
puted by taking a flat life expectancy figure. Mr. Wood 
stated he didn't know whether the computation of an an-
nuity upon a flat life expectancy basis was expressly dis-
approved by actuaries or not (R. 279). The complete Ameri-
can Experience Table of Mortality, as distinguished from 
the partial table set forth in the state statutes, indicated 
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for a particular age group how many persons of that group 
died during each year and how many continued to live (R. 
240-241) . It was possible to compute annuities on the basis 
of such detailed information, rather than on the basis of the 
flat average shown by the life expectancy chart (R. 241-
242). Exhibit G, however, was computed on the basis of the 
flat life expectancy figure, rather than by using the com-
plete American Experience Table (R. 242). 
The basic assumption of Exhibit G, so far as its appli-
cation to a particular individual, was that the same condi-
tions would obtain constantly throughout the entire period 
contemplated by the exhibit (R. 276). If the earning capa-
city of a person should increase at any time during the 
period, it would not be reflected in Exhibit G (R. 277). If 
an insurance actuary were computing annuities, considera-
·- tion would be given to the particular occupation and occupa-
tional hazards of the individual (R. 278), and railroad men 
would be given a higher mortality rating (R. 278). It also 
could be said of Exhibit G that it did not take into considera-
=-·· 
tion such factors as sickness, disability, vacations, and the 
like, which affect the earnings of an employee (R. 278-
279). Neither did Exhibit G take into consideration the 
possibility of retirement, which for most railroad employees 
occurred around sixty-five years of age (R. 279). Nor did 
Exhibit G take into consideration state and federal taxes 
deducted from the incomes of most of us (R. 279). Ex-
hibit G gave no consideration to any of these factors (R. 
278) . Many of these factors could be included in Exhibit 
G, by a proper actuarial computation (R. 279). In response 
to leading questions by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Wood several 
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times asserted that the computations on Exhibit G were 
mathematically correct (R. 238, 244, 246, 258). 
At several points during the examination of Mr. Wood, 
the defendant made objections not only to the materiality 
of his testimony (R. 237, 238), but particularly to the in-
troduction in evidence of Exhibit G and of the contents 
thereof (R. 243, 267). Specific objections were made to 
the admission of the evidence upon the grounds : that Ex-
hibit G admittedly was based upon information and data not 
before the court; that it was hearsay; that there was no 
sufficient showing that the material and data upon which 
Exhibit G was based was generally recognized or accepted 
as competent for the purpose for which it apparently had 
been used (R. 243, 244-251); that there was no proper 
foundation for the admission in evidence of Exhibit G; 
also that Exhibit G was inadmissible because it affirmative-
ly appeared from the testimony that the witness had not 
checked the accuracy of the computations therein (R. 267). 
At the conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Wood at the morn-
ing session of court, the trial judge sustained the defendant's 
objections. At the afternoon session, however, after the 
witness had brought into the court room a book or books 
from which he claimed to have taken part of the informa-
tion included in Exhibit G, and after the witness had testi-
fied in answer to leading questions by the trial judge that 
the books were "standard" (R. 267), the trial court reversed 
its prior decision, overruled the defendant's objections and 
permitted Exhibit G to be introduced in evidence (R. 268). 
After the introduction in evidence of Exhibit G, the witness 
Wood then was permitted to step down in front of the jury, 
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display the exhibit, and explain its contents (R. 270~271), 
notwithstanding the defendant's objection that the written 
document spoke for itself without the necessity of further 
stating its contents to the jury (R. 269-270). 
By means of the witness Wood, the plaintiff also sought 
to introduce in evidence Exhibit H. Exhibit H apparently 
was the same type exhibit as Exhibit G, except that in-
·- stead of using the life expectancy averages of the Am~rican 
c Experience Table of Mortality, the so-called United States 
Life Table, 1939-1941, Department of Commerce was con-
. ~· 
sulted. The latter document seemingly indicated higher ex-
pectancy figures than shown by the American Experience 
Table. Otherwise, the same sources of information were 
used in preparing Exhibit H as were used in preparing Ex-
hibit G (R. 272, 274-275). It was Mr. Wood's "understand-
ing" that the United States Life Table was prepared by the 
Department of Commerce (R. 271). He had obtained his 
copy several years previous and had possessed it several 
years (R. 273). He did not know whether or not the table 
was used by insurance actuaries ( R. 273) . He didn't. think 
the table was recognized by the statutes of the State of 
Utah (R. 273). No one that the witness knew, nor any com-
pany in the State of Utah, used the so-called United States 
Life Table. It was used for purposes of comparison (R. 
273). Mr. Wood further stated that according to "the ex-
planation of the table" (R. 272) it was broken down into 
divisions for white males and white females, and similar 
divisions for colored persons. It included citizens of every 
kind and all professions and occupations (R. 271-272). The 
table indicated that a white male, age twenty-six, had an 
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expectancy of 42.38 years or 509 months (R. 272). Also, 
Exhibit H was mathematically correct (R. 272). 
Upon the basis of the foregoing testimony, Exhibit 
H then was offered in evidence. Defendant objected upon 
the grounds that insufficient foundation had been laid for 
the introduction of the exhibit; that there had been no 
proper authentication of the so-called United States Life 
Table, and that there was no evidence that these tables had 
any general recognition in the State of Utah, or among in-
surance companies, actuaries, accounting systems, or any 
other such institutions ( R. 273-27 4). But the trial court 
overruled the objection and admitted Exhibit H in evidence 
(R. 274). 
Various other incidents which occurred during the trial 
and certain other portions of the testimony adduced are set 
forth herein under subdivision III of defendant's argument, 
pertaining to the excessive verdict awarded by the jury. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence plain-
tiff's Exhibit G, also in admitting certain testimony in con-
nection therewith, for the reason that said exhibit and testi-
mony were not properly authenticated and were based upon 
hearsay and second hand information, also for the reason 
that Exhibit G and similar such exhibits are immaterial and 
incompetent for any purpose. 
2. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence plain-
tiff's Exhibit H, for the reason that said exhibit was based 
in part upon information in the so-called United States Life 
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Table, which was never introduced in evidence or in any 
manner qualified by proper preliminary proof with respect 
to authenticity and accuracy. 
3. The trial court erred in refusing to grant the de-
fendant's motion for a new trial, in view of the excessive 
verdict returned by the jury under the influence of passion 
and prejudice engendered by the admission of improper 
testimony and by a series of prejudicial incidents occurring 
during the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE PLAINT'IF'F'S 
EXHIBIT G, ALSO IN ADMITTING CERTAIN ORAL 
TESTIMONY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
It is apparent from the testimony of the plaintiff's 
alleged expert witness, Mr. Ray G. Wood, that the written 
document Exhibit G consisted of computations based upon 
data derived from three separate sources, as follows: 
1. Certain information apparently taken from 
the life expectancy chart of the American Experience 
~ Table of Mortality. 
2. Certain information claimed to have been 
taken from tables and formulas contained in a book 
entitled "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity 
Tables." 
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3. Certain information claimed to have been 
calculated in the office of Mr. Wood, and based in 
part upon ·formulas contained in the above men-
tioned book. 
With reference to the first source of information, 
namely, the life expectancy chart of the American Experi-
ence Table of Mortality, no part of this table was introduced 
in evidence or in any manner produced before the trial 
court. The testimony of Mr. Wood as to what the table dis-
closed concerning the life expectancy of a person twenty-six 
years of age was mere hearsay; it was not the best evidence. 
Mr. Wood admitted that he had not personally looked up the 
information in the American Experience Table, nor had he 
checked it. Some other undisclosed person in his office had 
secured the information (R. 240). So far as Mr. Wood, 
himself, was concerned, the information to which he testi-
fied was second hand. So far as the court and jury in 
this case were concerned, the information was third hand. 
It is sometimes said that a court may take judicial 
notice of standard, recognized mortality tables. And it may 
be assumed that the life expectancy chart of the American 
Experience Table of Mortality, which is set forth in Volume 
6 of the Utah Code Annotated (1943), is such a standard, 
recognized table. Before judicial notice can be taken of 
such an evidentiary fact, however, a proper request for 
such dispensation must be made to the court. Wigmore on 
Evidence, Third Edition, Sec. 2568. Thereafter the trial 
court must declare the fact as established to the jury. Utah 
Code Annotated (1943), Sec. 104-5~4-4. No such procedure 
was followed in the instant case. 
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Although standard mortality tables are at times 
"judicially noticed," strictly speaking they are evidence ad-
missible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Wigmore 
on Evidence, Third Edition, Sec. 2566 ( 4) Note 7; Western 
& A. R. Co. v. Hyer, 113 Ga. 776, 34 S. E. 446. Again, as-
suming that the American Experience Table of Mortality 
as a standard, recognized table would be admissible in evi-
dence upon a proper offer and request for its admission, 
not even a feeble attempt to follow such procedure was made 
in the instant case. Instead, over the specific and timely 
objection of the defendant (R. 237), the witness Wood was 
permitted to give third hand testimony as to the contents of 
a table which was in no manner before the court. Similar 
testimony was held reversible error in Erb v. Popritz, 5·9 
Kan. 264, 52 P. 871, 873, in which the court stated: 
"Objection is also made to the testimony of a 
witness as to the expectancy of life of the deceased. 
Instead o~ offering standard life tables, showing 
the probable duration of life, the witness was al-
lowed to state his recollection of what the tables 
showed. He was engaged in the insurance business, 
and claimed to be acquainted with the mortality 
tables used by life insurance companies. Among 
others, he stated that he had knowledge of the 
Actuaries, Carlysle, and the American, but, instead 
of submitting the tables, he undertook to give the 
expectancy of life of one as old as Popritz was at the 
time of his death. The witness was not a physician, 
and had no special qualifications which enabled him 
to determine the probable duration of Popritz's life, 
but depended entirely upon such information as he 
had acquired from standard tables which he 
happened to have consulted in connection with the 
insurance business. Where recovery is sought in 
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cases of death or permanent InJury, standard life 
tables may be introduced to show the probable dura-
tion of life of one injured or killed, but the state-
ments of one who has no knowledge upon the subject, 
except such as he may have gained from consulting 
such tables, is not the best evidence." 
The second source of material in Exhibit G consisted 
of the claimed use of tables and formulas contained in a 
book tardily identified as "Financial Compound Interest 
and Annuity Tables." Obviously, the testimony of the wit-
ness Wood with respect to the 'contents of this book likewise 
was mere hearsay. At the outset of his testimony, the book 
referred to could not even be identified by the witness (R. 
243). Later, after the noon recess of court, the book was 
brought into the court room and identified merely as to title 
and publisher (R. 256). Then under leading questions pro-
pounded by the trial judge, the witness was permitted to 
state the conclusion that the book was "standard" and ac-
cepted as such by the people in his profession. Thereupon, 
the trial court allowed the testimony of the witness with 
respect to certain information claimed to have been taken 
from the book and included in Exhibit G, and also admitted 
in evidence Exhibit G (R. 268). 
In the first place, the trial court clearly erred in ad-
mitting in evidence information and data taken from the 
book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables," 
without the book itself first being offered and admitted. 
Under the circumstances, testimony out of the mouth of 
Wood concerning data allegedly taken from the book was 
not the best evidence. It was purely hearsay, and in turn was 
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based upon a publication which itself was hearsay. Cer-
tainly, the contents of the book did not prove themselves. 
Dallas Railzcay & Te·rminal Co. v. Guthrie, (Sup. Ct. Tex.) 
210 s. w. (2d) 550, 551. 
If the book or portions thereof had been offered in 
evidence, they would have been admissible like any other 
writings, upon proper foundation and preliminary proof 
with respect to authenticity and accuracy. Absent such 
proof, the book and its contents were meaningless. As dis-
tinguished from the American Experience Table of Mortal-
ity, given recognition as a standard authority by virtue of 
its inclusion in the State Code, there is nothing about the 
book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables" 
which entitles it to general recognition as a standard work 
for the purpose of actuarial calculations, without the neces-
sity of proper foundation and preliminary proof. This 
principle is elementary in its application to any written 
document, whether public or private. See for example, At-
lanta, B. & C. R. Co. v. Patterson (App. Ga.), 43 S. E. (2d) 
177, 181 (report of U.S. Department of Commerce, Weather 
Bureau, excluded from evidence because no proper founda-
tion had been laid for its introduction; no identification or 
authentication) ; Brown v. Republic Casualty & Surety Co., 
(App. Mo.) 31 S. W. (2d) 111 ("Red Book" showing aver-
:: age price of second hand automobiles held inadmissible) ; 
Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 ·Cal. App. 506, 2 P. (2d) 870 (hos-
pital records and testimony based on memoranda by others 
held inadmissible); United States v. Timmons, 68 F. (2d) 
654 (C. 'C. A. 5) (report by a government physician of a 
physical examination of a veteran at Veterans Bureau ex-
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eluded because not properly authenticated) ; Powell v. An-
derson, 147 Neb. 872, 2·5 N. W. (2d) 401 (an unsigned and 
unauthenticated copy of an 0. P. A. order, produced from 
the files of such agency, held secondary evidence and in-
admissible); United States v. Chandler, 87 F. (2d) 3S6 (C. 
C. A. 5) (government hospital records held admissible, if 
properly authenticated) ; Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575, 
35 S. E. (12'd) 871 (a non-statutory mortality table is ad-
missible, but must be identified and properly authenticated) ; 
Gaines v. Standard Accident Insurance Co. (La. App.) 32 
So. (2d) 633, (tables prepared by insurance companies show-
ing the distance required to bring vehicles to a stop under 
certain conditions held inadmissible, without authentica-
tion and proof of accuracy) . 
In the case at bar, there was a complete lack of pre-
liminary proof with respect to the accuracy and authenticity 
of the book "Financial Compound Interest and Annuity 
Tables." The closest approach to any such evidence was the 
witness's conclusion that the book was "standard" in his 
profession, in answer to the leading question propounded 
by the trial court (R. 267). This "conclusion" is valueless, 
however, when considered in the light of the other testimony 
by the same witness. Mr. Wood stated that he had checked 
with only. one institution in Salt Lake City to find out 
whether the book was in use, to wit, the First Security Trust 
Company. That institution used the book (R. 2156), but for 
what purpose was left unstated. He could name no other 
trust company, bank, or any one else in Salt Lake City, who 
used ·the book, though specifically so questioned by plain-
tiff's counsel (R. 25·6). Neither did he know whether or 
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not the American Institute of Accountants or any actuarial 
society ever had approved the book (R. 26·0-261). Also, he 
admitted that he never had checked the tables in the book, 
against the particular figures and computations used in 
Exhibit G (R. 257). Both plaintiff's counsel and the trial 
court erroneously assumed that the test of the authenticity 
of the tables and formulas in the book was whether the book 
was considered "standard" by accountants and whether it 
was used by banks or trust companies to compute bond and 
interest rates (R. 246). But the true and very minimum 
test of the authenticity of the book and of the tables and 
formulas contained therein, when used for the purpose of 
computing the present value of annuities, would be whether 
the book was generally recognized as standard, accurate, 
and authentic by insurance companies, actuaries and others 
whose particular business it was to compute annuities. The 
record in the present case is completely devoid of any such 
evidence. The witness Wood was an accountant (R. 235). 
He was not and didn't pretend to be an actuary (R. 239). 
His testimony failed to indicate that he had any knowledge 
or qualifications as an expert on annuities or that he had 
~ any familiarity with actuarial data or methods of calcula-
-- tion. In no sense, therefore, was he even qualified to authen-
ticate the book or the other actuarial materials in question. 
The third source of information for Exhibit G con-
sisted of certain mathematical calculations claimed to have 
been necessary because the tables and formulas in the book 
"Financial Compound Interest and Annuity Tables" ex-
tended only to 360 periods whereas Exhibit G contemplated 
457 periods (R. 250, 257-258). These particular mathe-
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matical calculations supposedly were made in Mr. Wood's 
office by some unidentified person. They were based in 
part upon formulas contained in the aforementioned book. 
Just what these formulas were and how the calculations 
were made the witness at no time stated. The foregoing 
calculations are, of course, subject to the same infirmities 
as admissible evidence, as the other tables and formulas tak-
en from the book and heretofore discussed. In addition, this 
particular evidence is subject to still another criticism. For 
if these particular mathematical calculations were, in part, 
the basis of the further computations set forth on Exhibit 
G, certainly there should have been some preliminary evi-
dence with respect to the identity of the person who did the 
calculating, his qualifications, and the accuracy of the calcu-
lations. As the record stands, no such preliminary proof 
was offered. All that is known is that the computations 
were·made in Mr. Wood's office. Wood, himself, had not 
personally checked the calculations (R. 246-247) and there 
was no evidence that they had been prepared or checked 
under his supervision or direction. The witness had made 
no independent calculations to verify the accuracy of the 
figures on Exhibit G (R. 2'65), although he had made calcu-
lations of figures of smaller denominations that were easier 
to figure ( R. 265) . He had never taken any of the figures 
and worked them out mathematically, without reliance upon 
the formulas in the book (R. 266). When askeq to do so in 
open court and demonstrate it to the jury, he said it could 
be done, but it would take him a month to work it out (R. 
265-266, 275). In the light of the foregoing testimony, the 
witness's repeated assertions that Exhibit G itself was 
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mathematically correct means nothing. The pertinent fact 
is there was no evidence at all of the accuracy of the par-
ticular calculations upon which the further computations 
on Exhibit G were based. 
After the data for Exhibit G had been secured from the 
three different sources above outlined, Exhibit G was de-
vised. This consisted of further computations based upon 
an application and combination of the information gathered 
from the three sources indicated. But what these further 
computations consisted of, or just what methods were ap-
plied, or how it was accomplished is left to the imagination. 
For the several reasons herein set forth, based upon 
the specific objections made by defendant throughout the 
testimony of the witness Wood, it is submitted that the trial 
court grievously erred in admitting Exhibit G. Although 
the use and admissibility of exhibits such as Exhibit G 
several times before has been considered by this Court, in no 
previous case so far as the defendant is aware, have the 
separate components which make up the exhibit been an-
alyzed by the testimony produced at the trial and timely 
objection made thereto. 
In addition to the particular objections to Exhibit G 
above set forth, the defendant also submits that the use and 
admissibility of all exhibits such as Exhibit G should be 
barred in the courts of this jurisdiction, on the general 
ground of their immateriality and incompetency. This, for 
the reason that experience has taught that their tendency 
is to confuse and mislead, rather than enlighten the jury; 
-:;_.r; that they are misused by juries as mere time tables in order 
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to calculate large and unreasonable verdicts, and that the 
consistent injustice caused by their use overbalances any 
supposed value they may possess. The defendant is not un-
aware, of course, that in Bruner v. McCarth!y, 105 Utah 
399, 142 P. (2d) 649, 6!56, this Court approved the use 
of an exhibit apparently somewhat similar to Exhibit Gin 
this case. But in Pauly v. McCarthy, 109' Utah 431, 
184 P. (2d) 123, although the use of such an exhibit was 
approved, the Court took pains to restrict the use to cases 
"where the injury alleged and proved is permanent, and is 
of such nature as to indicate a permanent material impair-
ment of a substantial nature in the earning capacity of the 
plaintiff * * *." Again, in Schlatter v. McCarthy, 
... Utah ... , 196 P. (2d) 9-68, 973, 974, the Court took 
occasion to reiterate the limitation imposed upon the use 
of the exhibit in the Pauly case, and made the further ob-
servation that the Court's experience with such exhibits 
had taught that they were "not an unmixed blessing." The 
Court further stated that its experience had shown that to 
"a certain extent they tend to mislead the jury. In using 
these tables, juries tend to select an amount shown on the 
table, very close to the average monthly wages of plaintiff 
at the time of his injury or death, and then to read the table 
like a time table. * * * The obvious vice of this pro-
cedure is that the jury fails to take into consideration the 
possibility of loss of future wages due to sickness, injuries, 
strikes or other causes, the probability that the employee 
will retire from active service before his death, and the 
almost certainty that with advancing age his earning capa-
city will decrease." 
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Interestingly enough, this Court was not the first to 
recognize the "obvious vice" of such exhibits. As early as 
1926, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a careful 
opinion by Chief Justice Moschzisker in McCaffrey v. 
Swartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 A. 810, 813, considered and re-
jected the use of the so-called present worth tables in view 
of that court's experience that "their presence almost in-
evitably tend to their misuse." In the course of its opinion, 
the court said : 
"We shall now consider subdivision (c) of the 
third question involved, which has to do with the 
admissibility in evidence of tables showing the pres-
ent worth of a dollar payable at a fixed date in the 
future. First, it must be understood that direct ap-
plication of annuity tables-calculated, as they are, 
on the basis of a constant annual amount-is never 
permissible in cases of the present type, because, if 
this course were pursued, the gradual decline in the 
average man's earning capacity toward the end of 
his days would make the result inaccurate in any 
given case. Present value tables have been held ad-
missible only to show the proportionate relation be-
tween payments which would ordinarily be made in 
the future and a lump sum to be awarded at once as 
compensation for their loss. rcitations.] The pur-
pose of admitting such tables has been to aid the 
jurors in making calculations they would otherwise 
have to figure out for themselves; but compensa-
tion for pecuniary loss is not to be arrived at by 
arithmetical processes alone, for it cannot be said 
that, the amount of the income being known, the loss 
is reduaed to a mere matter of calculation, the na-
ture of the income previously enjoyed by the person 
involved, and the probabilities of its continuance 
according to the particular circumstances on which 
it depends must be considered. 
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"In a case like the one at bar, plaintiff is no 
necessarily entitled to receive a perpetual annui~ 
calculated on his loss of income from the date of th 
accident, for it is possible that, without regard to th1 
effect of the accident in question, he might be dis 
abled by illness, natural decline or other causes fron 
continuing to earn the income he had before his in 
jury. After taking into account the income itself 
the circumstances under which it was earned b~ 
plaintiff, and all factors affecting the likelihood o1 
its continuance, increase, or diminution, as unaf-
fected by the accident, the jurors are to say what, in 
their opinion, is fair compensation for the impair-
ment of earning power, whether permanent or tem-
porary, under which plaintiff suffers because of the 
accident; and in order to work justice, the jury 
would have to understand that present value tables 
could not be applied until the probable expectancy 
of the life in question had been decided and the 
amounts of future yearly losses determined. As 
pointed out earlier in this opinion, such losses are 
those due to diminution of earning power, and, as 
before indicated in the immediately preceding para-
graph, usually a time arrives toward the end of the 
average man's life when his earning power becomes 
less and less ; in other words, the sums or losses to 
be decided on and reduced to their present value are 
variable in that, after a certain time, to be de-
termined in every case by the jury, the annual earn-
ings generally become smaller each year. To expect 
a jury to determine these dates and amounts, and 
then to apply the tables and reach present values, 
is to expect the impossible, as long experience has 
shown. The question is, What, in the light of this 
experience, should now be held as to the admissibil-
ity of such tables at a jury trial? Do they in fact 
aid the jury to make proper calculations, or does their 
presence almost inevitably tend to their misuse, or, 
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in other words, to the direct application of them as 
though they were annuity tables? We are unanimous-
ly forced to the latter conclusion. This being so, we 
take advantage of the instant case--where we have 
been materially aided by the researches and the 
arguments of able counsel, who considered all phases 
of the matter of proper evidence of future losses con-
nected with impairment of earning power-to say 
that the present worth tables should not be admitted 
at jury trials." 
The vice of Exhibit G in the instant case is demon-
'"' strated not only by the testimony heretofore analyzed con-
.. cerning the components upon which the exhibit was claimed 
=~: to be based, but also by the general observations of the 
-
....!. 
witness Wood, himself, regarding the exhibit. He conceded 
-· that the accuracy of the figures on Exhibit G was not per-
.· sonally checked by him (R. 246-247). Nor was there any · 
- evidence that the figures were checked by anyone under his 
~ 
supervision. In making the computations on the exhibit, 
::; the interest was compounded monthly, not annually (R. 
1 262), even though Mr. Wood admitted that he l<:new the 
:::: usual basis for such a computation by an actuary involved 
~; 
_ the compounding of interest annually (R. 262). Also, the 
annuities on Exhibit G were computed by taking a flat life 
::.: expectancy figure, even though it was possible to compute 
them on the basis of the detailed information set forth in 
; the complete American Experience Table (R. 240-2421). Mr. 
:-:.-
.. : Wood did not know whether the computation of annuities 
~~ 
, upon a flat life expectancy basis was or was not approved 
;/ by actuaries (R. 279). Moreover, the witness conceded 
~l that the basic assumption of Exhibit G, was the obviously . 
6t 
rrJ false assumption, that the same conditions with respect to 
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the earning power of the plaintiff and all other relevant fac-
tors, would obtain constantly throughout the entire period 
contemplated by the exhibit (R. 276). Exhibit G gave no 
consideration to the well known fact that railroad employees 
have a higher than average mortality rating (R. 278) ; also 
that the life-span earnings of an employee would be material-
ly affected by such factors as sickness, temporary disabil-
ities, vacations, and similar factors (R. 278-279). Neither did 
Exhibit G take into consideration the fact of retirement un-
der a pension plan arrangement which for most railroad 
employees occured at about 65 years of age (R. 279); nor 
the fact that no deductions for state or federal taxes were 
made in connection with the exhibit (R. 279). Still other 
factors to be considered were suggested in the opinion of this 
Court in Schlatter v. McCarthy, supra. The witness Wood 
admitted that many of these factors could have been included 
in Exhibit G by a proper actuarial computation (R. 279). 
The misuse of Exhibit G as a time table for measuring 
damages in cases such as the present one, is further aggra-
vated by the customary procedure by which such exhibits 
are presented in the trial court. The procedure followed 
provides for an undue repetition and emphasis to the jury 
of the same evidence. The present case illustrates this point. 
First, the witness Wood took the witness stand, and in the 
course of his examination and over the specific objection of 
the defendant (R. 238) was permitted to state in a general 
way the contents of Exhibit G (R. 238). Secondly, the wit-
ness was allowed to step down in front of the jury, display 
the exhibit, and again state its contents, notwithstanding 
the defendant's specific objection that the written docu-
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ment spoke for itself without the necessity of repeating its 
contents to the jury (R. 269-270). Third, the exhibit was 
introduced and the jurors permitted to examine it indi-
vidually. Fourth, the jurors were permitted to take the ex-
. hibit with them to the jury room, for use as .a time table in 
the computation of a verdict. 
Under what theory of law or common sense and fair 
play, is this second hand, hearsay collection of unproved 
possibilities and supposed probabilities entitled to such 
undue emphasis? Would the same rule which sanctions this 
procedure likewise permit the defendant to reduce to writ-
ten form the testimony of one of its favorable witnesses, 
have the contents of the purported written document orally 
stated several times to the jury in open court, and then have 
the document taken to the jury room for the jury to further 
- ponder upon? Of course, if the defendant even should at-
tempt such procedure it would be subject to severe censure, 
and rightly so. But what is the essential distinction between 
such a procedure and the use permitted the plaintiff of Ex-
hibit G? 
II 
- THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF'S 
,- EXHIBIT H, ALSO IN A:DMITTING CERT1AIN TES-
::C- TIMONY UPON WHICH EXHIBIT H PURPORTEDLY 
. ~ 
l~ WAS B~SED. 
The trial court admitted in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit 
, H, following the admission of Exhibit G (R. 274). Exhibit 
H was the same tYPe of an exhibit as Exhibit G. The witness ;: 
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Wood, through whom Exhibit H was introduced, stated 
that except for consulting the so-called United States Life 
Table in place of the American Experience Table, Exhibit 
H was based upon the same sources of information as Ex-
hibit G (R. 272, 27 4-275). The data claimed to have been 
taken from the so-called United States Life Table showed 
a substantially longer life expectancy period than the com-
parable figure from the American .Experience Table. A com-
parison of Exhibits G and H will reveal that the higher ex-
pectancy figure used in computing Exhibit H, resulted in 
much larger present worth figures for the monthly an-
nuities stated. For example, the indicated present value of 
a monthly annuity of $200 at 23)b% on Exhibit G is $54,-
613.17, whereas the comparable figure on Exhibit H is 
$,60,0S3. 71~a difference in round figures of about $5,500. 
All of the objections and arguments heretofore urged 
against the admissibility of Exhibit G are equally applicable 
to Exhibit H. In addition, the defendant makes a further 
contention with respect to the admission of Exhibit H, to 
the extent that it was based upon information claimed 
to have been contained in the so-called United States 
Life Tables. This supposed document or publi-cation, if 
it in f 1act exists, was never produced in open court or in 
any manner directed to the attention of the trial court. 
The only information concerning the alleged document 
came from the recollection of the witness Wood. Here 
again, the proper procedure would have been to have 
offered and introduced in evidence, after proper founda-
tion and preliminary proof, the fundamental data upon 
which Exhibit H was b~sed, including the so-called 
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United States Life Table. Since the alleged table, itself, 
neither was produced nor offered in evidence and since the 
court permitted secondary evidence concerning statistics 
taken therefrom, certainly the minimum requirement would 
consist of some substantial evidence regarding the 
authenticity and recognition of the purported table for the 
purposes for which it apparently was used. Otherwise, 
testimony concerning the contents of the so-called United 
States Life Table, supposedly incorporated in Exhibit H, was 
wholly without reliability or materiality. 
The necessity of preliminary proof of the authenticity 
and accuracy of a non-statutory mortality is well estab-
lished. Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575, 35 S. E. (2d) 871; 
Hampton v. Penn. R. Co. (App. N. J.) 179 A. 101; Banks 
v. Braman (Sup. Ct. Mass.) 80 N. E. 799; McKenna v. 
Citizens Natural Gas Co. (Sup. Ct. Penn.) 47 A. 990, 991; 
Notto v. Atlantic City R. Co. (App. N. J.) 69 A. 9'68; Gal-
veston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (Sup. Ct. Tex.) 17 S. W. 4'7, 50. 
An examination of the court's opinions in several of the 
cited cases, reveals almost identical analogies to the situ-
ation in the case at bar. 
Banks v. Braman, supra, was an action for personal 
injuries received in an automobile accident. The plaintiff 
offered in evidence and the trial court excluded a certain 
table purporting to show life expectancies according to the 
Actuaries' Combined Experience. Plaintiff excepted to 
this ruling, and upon appeal the ruling of the lower court 
was sustained. The Massachusetts Supreme Court said: 
"Under the plaintiff's claim that the injury to 
his back was permanent it was proper, if not neces-
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sary, for the jury in estimating the amount of com-
pensation to take into consideration the probable 
duration of his life; and on that question there can 
be no doubt that standard mortality or life ex-
pectancy tables would have been admissible. * * * 
"In this case a medical witness for the defend-
ant had before him a 'book on life insurance,' and 
turned to a 'table showing the expectancy of life for 
each year, from 15 to 85, according to the actuaries' 
combined experience.' When asked how such tables 
were 'gotten up,' he replied: 'They are gotten up by 
the actuaries of these companies, put into tables; 
indicates at each age the expectancy of life at that 
particular age.' Upon further inquiry, however, it 
appeared that the witness had no other information 
as to the authenticity of the table than that con-
tained in the book, or, in other words, that he was 
stating simply what upon its face this table appeared 
to be. The table was excluded. Under these circum-
stances it does not appear that the exclusion of the 
book was error. It does not appear that the table was 
in any respect a standard table or that it was well 
established or recognized authority, or even that 
it was in general use by life insurance companies. 
The judge well might have concluded upon the evi-
dence before him that the table was not sufficiently 
authenticated, and we cannot say that such a conclu-
sion was not warranted. In such a case he could 
rightly exclude it." 
McKenna v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., supra, was a 
suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by 
plaintiff and his wife in an explosion. After judgment for 
plaintiff, defendant appealed assigning as error, among 
other points, the reception in evidence of certain testimony 
concerning the life expectancy of the plaintiff and his wife. 
The court said: 
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"The first and second assignments of error re-
late to the reception of the testimony of Samuel 
Henry, offered for the purpose of showing the ex-
pectancy of the lives of Patrick Henry McKenna and 
Mary McKenna, his wife. He testified from a life 
table in a book entitled 'Handy Guide to Premium 
Rates, Applications, and Policies of American Life 
Insurance Companies.' The book was not offered in 
evidence, and all we know of it is what the witness 
testified to. It contained two mortality tables. In 
testifying to the expectancy of life, he read from the 
one designated 'Combined Actuaries Experience' 
table. On what this table is based, or from what ma-
terial it was constructed, is not disclosed by the evi-
dence. Whether it was founded on selected or in-
surable lives, or upon general population, or upon 
either, is not shown by the testimony. The character 
of the table, and its value as a basis from which 
to determine the expectancy of life, were not shown. 
The witness testified that the table was used for 
ascertaining rates, and that from this table he could 
calculate the expectancy of life at a given age. The 
competency of the witness and the weight of his 
testimony depended entirely upon the value of the 
table as evidence to establish the expectancy of life. 
Had the table itself been offered, under the facts 
disclosed at the trial it would have been rejected. 
The witness, therefore, should not have been per-
mitted to testify from it to the expectancy of life 
of the plaintiff and his wife. * * *" 
In Notto v. Atlantic City R. Co., supra, the court stated: 
"The only assignment of error that we think 
we need consider is 'that which challenges the ad-
mission in evidence of volume 20 of the American & 
English Encyclopaedia of Law to prove the Carlisle 
Mortality Tables. 
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"That mortality tables are admissible in a proper 
case has been decided by this court. Camden & At-
lantic R. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. Law, 646, 40 
Atl. 634. We there said that the authenticity of the 
paper produced as the table should be established 
by proof satisfactory to the court, as by the testimony 
of a witness familiar with it and with its use, and 
that its office and use should be explained by a 
competent witness. 
"The only proof in this case was by the tes-
timony of one of the counsel for the plaintiff, who 
produced the volume of the Encyclopaedia and testi-
fied that the tables represented the reasonable ex-
pectancy of life as shown from the experience 
gathered by insurance companies in America and 
England, and was known as the 'Carlisle Table.' 
Upon cross-examination he said he knew nothing 
other than what he saw in the book, and had not 
compared the table there given with a table recogn-
ized and established as the Carlisle Table. There was 
no preliminary proof as to his knowledge or use of 
the Carlisle Table, and we cannot assume that a 
lawyer is necessarily competent to testify as to the 
accuracy of a mortality table. That he was not 
familiar with the subject seems to be fairly inferable 
from his statement that the Carlisle Table is based 
on American as well as English experience. His 
knowledge of the character of the table was derived 
from what appeared on its face, and it did not pur-
port to be the Carlisle Table, but a table based on 
American experience. 
"We do not doubt that cases may arise in which 
the court will take judicial notice of the accuracy of 
mortality tables. They may be found in books in 
constant use by the courts for making calculations 
necessary to ascertain the value of annuities, or 
rights of dower and curtesy or may be adopted by 
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rule of court. But, before the court will take judicial 
notice of such tables, it ought to know, either by its 
own experience or the general use of the table by 
lawyers or actuaries, or its reputation, that it is 
accurate. We have no knowledge· that the table 
printed in the book in question has ever been used in 
such a way that we may fairly assume it to be ac-
curate. It seems to have been in print only since 
1902, and as far as we know has never been actually 
used for the purpose for which such tables are in-
tended. If it is, as it purports to be, correctly copied 
from a table authorized by statute in New York, a 
different question might be presented ; but as the 
case now stands this table was not admissible. That 
it may have been harmful appears from the refer-
ence made to it by the judge in his charge. 
"For this error the Judgment must be reversed." 
Again in Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Arispe, supra, 
_ the Texas Supreme Court held that: 
"'The court erred in permitting plaintiffs, over 
the objection of defendant, to introduce in evidence 
the table of the expectation of the years of life, con-
tained in the book entitled, "A Million of Facts: 
Conkling's Handy Manual of Useful Information, 
and Atlas of the World; all for twenty-five cents,"-
for the reason specified in defendant's bill of ex-
ception No. 1, and because the same was no authority, 
and of no higher character than any cheap book sold 
on railroads, and there was no evidence offered show-
ing the correctness of the table, and it was calculated 
to prejudice the minds of the jury against the de-
fendant.' * * * Suffice it to say that this book, 
however flattering may be its title, or alluring its 
price, is not one of those standard works of which 
the courts take judicial notice ~and recognize as 
authority, and consequently it should have been ex-
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eluded, in the absence of any proof of its correctness. 
On account of the errors indicated we conclude that 
the judgment should be reversed and the cause re-
manded." 
In the case at bar, there was not a scintilla of evidence 
"":'hich tended in any manner to authenticate or prove the 
accuracy of the so-called United States Life Table. In fact, 
the only testimony adduced at the trial, affirmatively 
showed the contrary. Mr. Wood stated that it was his "un-
derstanding" that the United States Life Table was pre-
pared by the Department of Commerce (R. 271). He had 
obtained his copy several years previous (R. 273). However, 
he did not know whether or not the table was used by in- · 
surance actuaries ( R. 2J3) , and he didn't think the table was 
recognized by the statutes of Utah (R. 273). He knew of 
no one, nor of any company in the State of Utah, who used 
the table. It was used for comparison (R. 273). Clearly, 
the foregoing testimony constituted no proper foundation 
for admission of the vital· information allegedly contained 
in the table. 
The prejudicial eharacter of this improperly admitted 
evidence can not be questioned. Attention already has been 
invited to a comparison of the alleged present worth figures 
set forth on Exhibits G and H, and to the substantial dif-
ference that an increased life expectancy of approximately 
four and one-half years makes in such computations. It 
also is significant that in its Instruction No. 13 (R. 65), 
the trial court expres'Sly limited and qualified the jury's 
consideration of information taken from American Experi-
ence Mortality Table, but no such qualifying instruction 
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ever was given with respect to the information purportedly 
taken from so-called United States Life Table. So far as the 
latter table was concerned and of Exhibit H based thereon, 
the jury were allowed an unrestricted field. Failure on the 
part of a trial court to give such a qualifying instruction 
in connection with the use of mortality tables has been held 
to constitute prejudicial error. A vance v. Thompson, 387 
Ill. 77, 55 N. E. (2d) 57, 60, cert. denied 323 U. S. 753, 
65 S. Ct. 82. 
III 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND RESULTED 
FROM PASSION AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF 
THE JURY, AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DE-
FENDANT·~s MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The jury returned a verdict in this case in the total 
- amount of $70,000 (R. 72). It is submitted that this large 
and excessive verdict, together with a series of prejudicial 
incidents occurring during the trial, demonstrate that the 
jury was influenced by passion and prejudice in arriving at 
its verdict, and that the trial court therefore abused its dis-
_. cretion in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a new 
·~ trial. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. (2d) 123 . 
..---
/ For such an abuse of discretion, this Court properly may 
~ take corrective action. Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 
44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192. 
:::-· In order to achieve a big verdict in this case, counsel 
5 for plaintiff apparently felt that every possible device had 
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to be resorted to, to stir the passion of the jury and to 
emphasize the issue of damages. The reason for this was 
obvious. The evidence on the issue of liability was exceed-
ingly weak. A brief outline of the pertinent facts will make 
this clear. When the engine and cut of fourteen cars on 
which plaintiff was riding at the time of his accident, 
moved forward on the ice house or stock track, plaintiff was 
stationed on the top of the rear or fourteenth car. He was 
standing on the walkway at about the center of the car (R. 
148). Plaintiff stated that he was standing near the middle 
of the car because that was the safest place to ride in the 
event of slack action (R. 160). In this position, a trainman 
can catch his balance in the event of any jerk or slack 
action in the train (R. 160). Some jerks and slack action in 
a train movement are naturally expected (R. 169). The 
plaintiff started forward from the center of the car, at the 
time when the car he was on was about one car length from 
the derail (R. 172). He intended to dismount when the car 
had reached the main line switch, some 5.50 feet further 
ahead (R. 160). There was a sharp curve in the track at 
the point of the derail (R. 170). This is clearly illustrated 
by the photograph, plaintiff's Exhibit B. When a freight 
car hits a curve there is naturally some lurching and 
wobbling of the car ( R. 171) . Plaintiff was familiar with 
the track and with the curve (R. 165). But he started for-
ward on the car, leaving his safe position at the center of 
the car, just before the car he was riding hit the curve at 
the derail (R. 171, 173). Plaintiff claimed, however, that 
as the car reached the derail, he was crouched down pre-
paratory to dismounting from the side ladder, when the 
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slack on the train ran in with a violent jerk that dislodged 
him and threw him from the car (R. 150). When he felt the 
slack action, he had hold of his lantern and brake club with 
one hand and hold of the grab iron on top of the car with 
his other hand (R. 153). The foregoing facts, on the basis of 
familiar and traditional principles of the law of negligence, 
would be considered wholly insufficient to support a verdict. 
See for example Gulf, M & N R. Co. v. Wells, 27·5 U. S. 455, 
48 S. Ct. 151. But regardless of recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, which apparently have 
changed traditional concepts of liability based upon fault in 
cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (Missouri 
Pac. R. Co. v. Keeton, 20'7 Ark. 793, 183 S. W. (2d) ·505, 
reversed without opinion 326 U. S. 689, 66 S. Ct. 135; Wilk-
erson v. McCarthy, ... Utah ... , 187 P. (2d) 188, reversed 
... U. S .... , 69 S. Ct. 413,), the plain fact still remains 
that the evidence of liability in the instant case was excep-
tionally thin. Plaintiff's counsel, realizing th~at a heavy 
verdict could not be expected so far as the issue of liability 
was concerned, therefore resorted to various other means 
and methods to influence the sympathy and prejudice of 
the jury. 
One of the plaintiff's chief efforts to influence the 
judgment of the jury on the issue of damages, consisted 
of the improper introduction in evidence of the Exhibits 
G and H. As previously pointed out, the jury was per-
mitted to hear testimony concerning these exhibits, to ex-
amine them, and then to take them to the jury room. As 
elsewhere argued, the admission in evidence of these ex-
hibits not only constituted unfair repetition and emphasis 
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of exceedingly prejudicial testimony, but also was improper 
as a matter of law. Especially harmful was the admission of 
the unauthenticated and unproved life expectancy figures 
reputedly taken from a so-called United States Life Table. 
The information claimed to have been taken from this al-
leged table was admitted without any qualifying instruc-
tion by the trial court, such as given in connection with the 
American Experience Table of Mortality (R. 65). As here-
tofore stated, the "hearsay" life expectancy figure from the 
so-called United S'tates Life Table, indicated an increased 
expectancy of approximately four and one-half years over 
the American Experience Table. Undoubtedly, this figure 
when included in the computations on Exhibit H had a 
seriously prejudicial influence on the verdict returned by 
the jury. 
Another factor calculated to excite the passion and 
prejudice of the jury, with telling effect upon the amount 
of the verdict, was the improper and wholly unnecessary 
exhibition to the jury of the stump of plaintiff's arm. 
Counsel for plaintiff attempted such an exhibition twice 
during plaintiff's case in chief (R. 158, 288). The first at-
tempt was made during the direct examination of the plain-
tiff, himself. The trial court reserved ruling on the matter 
at that time and counsel temporarily abandoned his attempt 
(R. 158). It is significant to note, however, that on this 
occasion even counsel for the plaintiff characterized the 
proposed procedure as "inflammatory" (R. 158). The ex-
hibition next was attempted during the direct examination 
of plaintiff's witness Dr. Clegg. On that occasion, permis-
sion was requested for the ostensible reason that the ex-
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hibition was necessary in order for Dr. Clegg to point out 
the condition of the stump (R. 228). The defendant ob-
jected on the following grounds : ( 1) that exhibition of the 
stump was unnecessary to enable Dr. Clegg to testify con-
cerning its condition; (2) that the- nature and extent of the 
plaintiff's injury and the condition of the stump already 
had been detailed by prior evidence and could be made even 
more clear by further testimony from Dr. Clegg; (3) that 
the nature and extent of the injury to plaintiff's arm was 
in no way disputed. Defendant also pointed out to the trial 
court that obviously the only purpose of the exhibition was 
to inflame the sympathy and stir the prejudice of the jury 
(R. 228-229). Nevertheless, the trial court overruled the 
defendant's objections and permitted the exhibition (R. 
229). A perusal of the subsequent testimony of Dr. Clegg 
will reveal that not a single fact stated by him either re-
quired or was made more understandable by the exhibition 
which followed (R. 229-233) . Exhibition of an impaired 
member, where the nature and extent of the injury is not 
disputed, as in the. present case, has been held to constitute 
reversible error. O'Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co., 319 
TIL App. 336, 49 N. E. (2d) 274, 278. In the cited case, the 
Supreme Court of Illinois quoted with approval from an 
earlier case of Wagner v. Chicago R. I & P. Ry. Co., 227 
Ill. 114, 115 N. E. 201, 203, as follows: 
"Whether one who is injured may exhibit an 
injured member to the jury is primarily in the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and it is properly ex-
ercised in any case where the personal view will aid 
the jury in understanding the evidence, and that 
may be so where there is no controversy concerning 
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the injury nor the extent of it, as was the fact in 
this case. * * * Where, however, the only pur-
pose and effect of an exhibition of that kind is to 
excite feeling rather than to enlighten the jury as to 
any fact or to aid in settling any disputed question 
of fact, it should not be permitted. In this case, there 
was not only no controversy concerning the injury 
nor the extent of it, as was stated at the time of the 
proposed exhibition, but the evident purpose was 
to excite in the minds of the jury pity and com-
miseration for the condition of the plaintiff and 
thereby to increase the damages. The exhibition for 
the purpose which the record shows was intended 
should not have been allowed, and if it now appeared 
that the damages allowed were excessive it would 
be necessary to reverse the judgment. * * *" 
Still another prejudicial incident occurring during the 
trial, and designed to arouse the sympathy and passion of 
the jury, took place during the lengthy direct examination 
. 
of the plaintiff. At no time during the trial was the prior 
good health of the plaintiff in dispute. Yet under questions 
from his counsel, plaintiff testified that prior to his injury 
his health was very good (R. 130). He also stated that when 
he entered railroad service in November, 1945, he satisfac-
torily passed a physical examination; that he subsequently 
was given another physical examination (R. 131). Then, 
although the fact was wholly immaterial and trivial, plain-
tiff's counsel asked the plaintiff for the exact date of the 
subsequent physical examination and urged the plaintiff 
to look it up in the papers in his pocketbook (R. 131). This 
required the plaintiff to reach into his pocketbook with his 
one hand and awkwardly to fumble for the papers with the 
same hand, thereby dramatically demonstrating to the jury 
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his difficulty in handling such an object as a pocketbook. 
After this little theatrical had been prolonged a sufficient 
length of time to duly excite the jury, without the "vital" 
date being produced, counsel announced that the date would 
be looked up and the information given to the jury the next 
morning (R. 131). Of course, no subsequent mention was 
made of the matter the next morning or at any other time 
during the course of the trial. 
Still another example of the prejudicial manner in 
which plaintiff's case was presented to the jury is illus-
trated by a recital of the circumstances· under which plain-
tiff interrupted the presentation of defendant's case in 
chief, attempted to bolster his case with additional evidence 
with respect to liability, and further emphasized the plain-
tiff's injury by cumulative evidence with respect to the 
plaintiff's pain and suffering and disability. Upon com-
pletion of the examination of the witness Wood, counsel for 
plaintiff· very specifically and emphatically stated that the 
plaintiff rested his case, except for certain additional evi-
dence concerning the present worth exhibits to be presented 
through Mr. Wood after the noon recess (R. 25.3 ... 254). 
Thereafter, counsel for defendant made an opening state-
ment to the jury (R. 254), following which the trial court 
took the usual noon recess (R. 255). After the recess, the 
plaintiff was permitted to introduce further testimony from 
Mr. Wood (R. 2;56-280). Then, at the conclusion of Wood's 
testimony, counsel for plaintiff requested permission of 
the court to reopen the plaintiff's ·case for the stated pur-
pose of introducing a "few bits of evidence" with respect 
to the freight car upon which Bennett was riding at the 
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time he was injured, and also for the purpose of introducing 
additional evidence with respect to the present disability 
of the plaintiff that more fully would cover the situation 
than revealed by the testimony thus far (R. 280). De-
fendant objected to this request, for the reason that plain-
tiff previously had rested his case, with the exception of 
the additional testimony from the witness Wood which then 
had been given; also for the reason that the defendant al-
ready had begun its case and presented its opening state-
ment and that proper procedure, therefore, indicated that 
the defendant should be permitted to go forward with its 
case (R. 280-281). But the trial court overruled the de-
fendant's objections and perm,itted the plaintiff to introduce 
further evidence. (R. 281). Thereafter, the plaintiff resumed 
the witness stand and gave additional testimony touc;hing 
upon the issue of liability, beyond any announced intention 
of his counsel (R. 281-286). Next, the plaintiff called to the 
witness stand Mrs. Bennett, the mother of the plaintiff (R. 
286). She gave extensive cumulative testimony concerning 
not merely the "present disability" of plaintiff, but also 
graphic details concerning the plaintiff's pain and suffering 
and the extent of his disability since the date of his injury 
(R. 287-289). Only after all of the foregoing evidence had 
been presented by the plaintiff, presumably as part of his 
case in chief, was the defendant again permitted to proceed 
(R. 289). AUhough the order of proof at the trial, ordinar-
ily is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, the ap-
plication of the 'Court's discretion ought not to be permitted 
to work unf,airly against one of the contesting parties. In 
the present case, the plaintiff not only was allowed to in-
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terrupt and break the momentum and effectiveness of the 
defendant's case in chief, but the trial court also permitted 
the plaintiff to bolster his case with additional and cumula-
tive evidence on vital points, after hearing the proof to be 
offered by the defendant as outlined in counsel's opening 
statement. 
Another factor which undoubtedly influenced the jury 
and contributed to the excessive verdict was the trial court's 
Instruction No. 11. In that instruction the trial court told 
the jury what damages it might award to plaintiff in the 
event it found the issues against the defendant. The charge 
with respect to the several elements of damage was as fol-
lows (R. 63): 
"In determining the amount of such damage, 
you may consider the nature and extent of his in-
jury thus sustained, and the amount of suffering, 
both mental and physical, that he has endured, ,and 
that he will probably endure in :the future; and the 
extent to which he has been prevented and will be 
prevented from engaging in the ordinary and usual 
affairs of life as theretofore enjoyed by him, and 
his loss of bodily function and disfigurement. You 
may likewise consider his actual loss of past earn-
ings, and any impairment of earning capacity in the 
future." 
The defendant specifically excepted to that part of 
the foregoing instruction reading - "and his loss of bodily 
function and disfigurement" (R. 350'). 'The quoted instruc-
tion advised the jury that it could conside,r five distinct 
elements of damage in arriving at a verdict, namely: (1) 
the nature and extent of the injury; (2) mental and physical 
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pain and suffering, both past and future; (3) the extent to 
which plaintiff had been and would be prevented from en-
gaging in the usual affairs of life; (4) plaintiff's loss of 
bodily function and ddsfigurement ; and ( 5) loss of past 
earnings and impairment of future earning capacity. 
It is at once apparent that to a marked degree, the fore-
going instruction was duplicitous and authorized the assess-
ment of double and even triple damages. Any damage 
element involved in a "loss of bodily function and dis-
figurement" necessarily would be included in the elements 
denominated "nature and extent of the injury" and "mental 
and physical pain and suffering, both past and present." 
Apart from being implicitly included in these two elements, 
no principle of law sanctions recovery for "loss of bodily 
function and disfigurement" in and of itself. Although in-
structions of a similarly redundant type were criticized by 
this Court in Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 
(2d) 649, 6·54, and Allison v. McCarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147 
P. (2d) 870, 874, they were held not sufficiently erroneous· 
to constitute reversible error. In both of the cited cases, 
however, such instructions were expressly disapproved. It 
is apparent from the present case, that scant attention has 
been paid to this Court's criticism. Certainly, there can be 
little doubt but that the instruction as given worked to the 
material prejudice of the defendant and left the jury free 
to find an excessive verdict based on a confusing and re-
dundant instruction with respect to the recoverable elements 
of damage. Contrast with Instruction 11, the precise defini-
tion of the recoverable elements of damage in a personal in-
jury action as set forth by the United States Supreme Court 
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in the leading case of Vicksburg and M. R. Co.' v. Putnam, 
118 u. s. 545, 554: 
"In an action for a personal injury, the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover compensation, so far as it is 
susceptible of an estimate in money, for the loss and 
damage caused to him by the defendant's negligence, 
including not only expenses incurred for medical at-
tendance, and a reasonable sum for his pain and 
suffering, but also a fair recompense for the loss of 
what he would otherwise have earned in his trade or 
profession, and has been deprived of the capacity of 
earning, by the wrongful act of the defendant." 
Finally, it is obvious that the amount of the verdict in 
the instant case is grossly excessive, and suffi:cient in itself, 
to demonstrate passion and prejudice on the part of the 
jury. It is based upon the patently false assumption that 
the plaintiff would be totally and permanently diS"abled for 
the rest of his life. The testimony of the plaintiff indicated 
that he entered railroad service in November, 19'45 (R. 
131). In the year 1945 he worked for the railroad only 
during the months of November and December (R. 161). 
His average net earnings or "take home" pay for the year 
1946 amounted to about $250 per month (R. 160). For the 
year 1947, his average salary was about $265 per month 
(R. 160). In the years 1946 and 1947, plaintiff claimed 
that he earned more than at any other time he had worked 
for the railroad (R. 161). For the three years 1945, 1946, 
1947, plaintiff's average "take home" pay was $250 to $265 
per month (R. 1611-162). Net earnings were gross earnings, 
less deductions for railroad retirement and federal income 
tax (R. 160). On the basis of the abortive Exhibit G, at an 
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interest discount of 23,4 o/o, the present value of a monthly 
annuity of $2'50 would amount to approximately $70,000, the 
amount of the verdict returned in this case. Thus, the jury 
assumed that for the remainder of plaintiff's claimed life 
expectancy, he would be totally and permanently disabled. 
This would be true even if it were assumed that a reasonable 
award were made for the plaintiff's claim for pain and suf-
fering. It is apparent that the verdict was based upon an 
assumption contrary to all reason and human experience. 
Certainly, a young man such as the plaintiff will not spend 
the rest of his days in an idle vacuum. The evidence indicated 
that he was a young man of good health, attractive personal-
ity and of better than average intelligence. He was a high 
school graduate, with some college training (R. 130). Al-
though he had sustained a serious handicap in the loss of his 
arm, it is a matter of common knowledge that there are many 
jobs and means of employment in which he can engage, if he 
so desires. His earning capacity by no means has totally 
vanished for the remainder of his life. Such, however, seem-
ingly was the basis of the verdict returned by the excited 
jury in this case. 
In Pauly v. McCarthy, supra, this Court stated that a 
"verdict might be so gross,ly excessive and disproportionate 
to the iJ!jury that we could say from that fact alone that as 
a matter of law the verdict must have been arrived at by 
passion or prejudice." The defendant submits that the 
present verdict of $70,000. would bring this case within that 
category. In any event, the excessive verdict, plus the 
pattern of prejudicial incidents and errors at the trial as 
herein outlined, demonstrate that the jury was influenced 
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by passion and prejudice in its decision, and that the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to grant the defend-
ant's motion for a new trial. 
Under the above circumstances and for the reasons 
specified in the defendant's several assignments of error, 
it is submitted that this Court should reverse and remand 
the judgment entered in the lower court, with instructions 
to grant a new trial. 
Respectfully, 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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